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COMMENTS
NEW YORK'S TAX AND DEBT LIMITS
AND CLASSIFIED PROPERTY TAX
ASSESSMENTS: TIME FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT?
I. Introduction
During the 1981 session, New York legislators plan to revise sec-
tion 306 of the Real Property Tax Law,' which requires property
to be assessed for taxation at its full value.' A change, however, in
this law may also have an unintended effect on the manner in
which local government borrowing and taxing powers are restricted
by the state constitution,' thus substantially reducing the amount
of revenue that local governments may obtain by borrowing and
taxing. This result would have immediate impact on municipalities
such as New York City which raise revenues at levels close to the
constitutional limits. The effect could also be felt by all local gov-
ernments which raise revenues through borrowing by making lo-
cally issued bonds a speculative investment, causing interest rates
to rise."
An important impetus to the enactment of legislation amending
section 306 is the court of appeals decision in Hellerstein v. As-
sessor, Town of Islip,' which required the Town of Islip to assess
all real property at its full value in compliance with the law. This
decision overruled a series of cases which treated section 306 as
unenforceable.6 Other recent developments, especially decisions re-
1. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 306 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
2. N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1981, at B6, col. 5; Albany Fixes New Deadline on Hellerstein,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 5.
3. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 4 (borrowing), 10 (taxing). In addition to these restrictions,
article XVIII, § 4 restricts debt for slum-clearance projects. Because this limitation is calcu-
lated in a different manner than are the article VIII restrictions, the legislation described in
this Comment may not have any of the described potential effects on this restriction. See
note 46 infra.
4. See note 175 infra and accompanying text.
5. 37 N.Y.2d 1, 332 N.E.2d 279, 371 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1975), modified, 39 N.Y.2d 920, 352
N.E.2d 593, 386 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1976).
6. See notes 96-97 infra and accompanying text.
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garding taxpayer challenges to property assessments, have also
precipitated action.
This Comment will discuss the effect of a modification of the
assessment standard on New York's constitutional borrowing and
taxing restrictions, which were adopted when illegal fractional as-
sessment was the rule throughout the state. Section II describes
these tax and debt restrictions, which limit the amount of revenue
that local governments may obtain from these sources to certain
percentages of local property wealth. Section III describes property
tax assessment systems, including the classified assessment system
declared illegal in New York in Hellerstein. Section IV discusses
the interaction between recently proposed classification legislation
and the tax and debt limits. Section V considers the possible effect
of the classification legislation upon antecedent municipal debts.
II. Constitutional Tax and Debt Limits in New York
Many states have placed a check 'on excessive governmental
spending by establishing restrictions on the power of local govern-
ment officials to raise revenue by taxing and borrowing.8 These
limits are frequently stated in terms of either the assessed or full
values of local property.' New York's restrictions are found in arti-
cle VIII of the constitution, 0 and date back to the late 1800's."
Even in the earliest versions of these limitations, numerous ex-
ceptions and exemptions existed, 2 and their number has increased
over the years.'3 The limitations do establish some guidelines, how-
ever, and municipal borrowing and taxing powers bear a substan-
tial relationship to the limits while not strictly adhering to them.1 4
7. See note 45 infra.
8. See B. MANN & F. BIRD, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL BORROWING
AND PROPERTY TAXING POWERS table 2 (1964).
9. Id.
10. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 4 (borrowing limit), 10 (tax limit).
11. Comment, Local Finance: A Brief Constitutional History, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 135,
136-42'(1979) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional History].
12. When the first restriction limiting debt to a fixed percentage of assessed value was
enacted in 1884, it contained an exclusion for debt associated with water bonds and for
certificates of indebtedness or revenue bonds issued in anticipation of taxes of the year pay-
able. Id. at 140.
13. See N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 4, 5A.
14. See McCabe v. Gross, 274 N.Y. 39, 46, 8 N.E.2d 269, 271-72 (1937) ("The mischief to
be prevented [by the debt limits] was the creation of an excessive debt, the carrying charges
[Vol. IX
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A. Constitutional Debt Restrictions
New York's constitutional debt restrictions apply only to long-
term debt. Short-term debt is restricted, if at all, by state and local
law.15
Long-term debt is used to fund capital projects, the rationale be-
ing that the cost of the project can be amortized over a period of
time and all the users can subsidize the investment.18 Long-term
debt must be intended for municipal purposes.1 7 It may not be
contracted for longer than the period of usefulness of the object or
purpose of the indebtedness, and for no longer than forty years.18
Long-term debt must be backed by the full faith and credit of the
jurisdiction.1' Municipalities are prohibited from issuing bonds
backed only by a moral obligation.' 0
The constitutional debt limits restrict the power of local govern-
ments to borrow out of proportion to local property wealth. These
limitations are measured in terms of percentages of the full valua-
tion of taxable real estate within the jurisdiction."' The value of
taxable real estate is averaged over five years"s so that fluctuations
of which would. fall upon current revenues, and the principal upon posterity.").
15. See, e.g., N.Y. LocAL FIN. LAW art. 2, tit. 2, § 29.00 (budget notes) (McKinney 1968
& Supp. 1981).
16. McCabe v. Gross, 274 N.Y. 39, 8 N.E.2d 269 (1937). See also Comment, The Consti-
tutional Debt Limit and New York City, 8 FORDHAM Usa. L.J. 185, 186 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Debt Limit and New York City].
17. N.Y. CoNsrT. art.. VIII § 2. Murphy v. Erie County, 28 N.Y.2d 80, 268 N.E.2d 771,
320 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1971).
18. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
19. Id. See N.Y. LocAL FIN. LAW § 100 (McKinney 1968). See also Tierney v. Cohen, 268
N.Y. 464, 198 N.E. 225 (1935) ("A pledge of the city's faith and credit is both a commitment
to pay and a commitment of the city's revenue generating powers to produce the funds to
pay."). Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 735, 358 N.E.2d
848, 851, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22, 25 (1976).
20. 40 N.Y.2d at 735-36, 358 N.E.2d at 852, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
21. The following limits are applied to the full valuation of local real property:
1) counties: seven percent, except for Nassau County: ten percent
2) City of New York: ten percent
3) cities other than New York, with populations over 125,000: nine percent
4) cities with populations less than 125,000: seven percent
5) towns and villages: seven percent
6) school districts within cities with less than 125,000 inhabitants: five percent (sub-
ject to increase).
N.Y. CONsT. art. VIII, § 4.
22. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 10.
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in real estate values due to short-term economic conditions are
minimized.2
For a number of reasons, the effective debt limits are actually far
higher than the constitutional restrictions would make them ap-
pear. Overlapping jurisdictions issue debt supported by the same
property so that borrowing powers as applied to any individual's
property may easily exceed the limits.2 4 Also, numerous types of
indebtedness 5 and specific instances of borrowing are excluded
from the limits." Consequently, the debt restrictions are subject to
substantial stretching by the overlapping jurisdictions and the nu-
merous exceptions and exemptions.27
B. Constitutional Tax Limits
The constitutional tax limits operate in much the same way as
the debt limits.' 8 They limit the ability of local governments to
levy real property taxes; other non-property taxes are authorized
or limited by statutes.' 9 The base for the tax limitation is the same
as that for the debt limit: the five year average of the full value of
taxable real estate in the jurisdiction. 0 Where taxing jurisdictions
23. See TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE 1967 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, LocAL
FINANCE 50 (Jan. 27, 1967) [hereinafter cited as LOCAL FINANCE].
24. When statutory limits are included (for example, three percent for fire districts and
ten percent for village school districts pursuant to N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW art. 2, tit. 8, §
104.00 (McKinney 1968), the limits applied to an individual's property are substantially
higher, rising as high as 37%, for Nassau County). See Macchiarola, Local Finances under
the New York State Constitution with an Emphasis on New York City, 35 FORDHAM L.
REv. 263, 274, 276 (1966).
25. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 5A.
26. Id. § 4.
27. "[T]he numerous exemptions distort any real relation between capacity and power to
incur debt. . . . In effect, they afford little meaningful regulation of municipal finance."
Macchiarola, supra note 24. See also Gelfand, Seeking Local Government Financial Integ-
rity Through Debt Ceilings, Tax Limitations, and Expenditure Limits: The New York City
Fiscal Crisis, the Taxpayers' Revolt, and Beyond, 63 MINN. L. REV. 545, 560, 568-69 (1979).
28. The limits are:
1) counties: one and one-half to two percent
2) City of New York: two and one-half percent
3) cities other than New York: two percent
4) villages: two percent
5) school districts within cities with less than 125,000 inhabitants: one and one-
fourth to two percent.
N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 10.
29. See, e.g., N.Y, TAX LAW (McKinney 1975).
30. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 10.
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overlap, the tax limitations are added, so that a single parcel of
property may be subject to taxes covered by a number of
limitations.3'
The most important exclusion from the tax limits enables juris-
dictions to levy taxes outside the limits in order to pay interest or
principal on indebtedness.2 Although the legislature has a consti-
tutional duty to restrict local powers of taxation, assessment and
indebtedness to prevent abuses, 3 it is also prevented by the consti-
tution from interfering with local tax levies to repay borrowing."
Another important exclusion from the tax limits involves the as-
signment of periods of probable usefulness to non-capital budget
items, and then borrowing, as opposed to taxing, to pay for these
expenditures." Section 11 of the Local Finance Law 6 establishes
periods of probable usefulness for capital expenses, but also in-
cludes a number of projects that could more properly be consid-
ered expense budget items.38 The courts periodically invalidate
these budgetary loopholes. For example, in Hurd v. City of Buf-
falo,38 the appellate division held a provision of section 1139 uncon-
stitutional because it exempted from the constitutional tax limits
certain municipal tax levies for pension and retirement payments.
The court reasoned that if these payments were to be considered
to have useful lives beyond the year that the expenditures were
31. The total of tax limits when overlapping jurisdictions are included ranges from 2.5%
in New York City to 6.0% for cities with populations of 125,000 or less. LocAL FINANCE,
supra note 23, at 47.
32. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 12.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. This is authorized by N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § llb. See LOCAL FINANCE, supra note
23, at 55.
36. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1980).
37. See ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE Crrv oF NEW YORK, PROPOSALS TO STRENGTHEN
LocAL FINANCE LAWS IN NEW YORK STATE 20 (Vol. 34, No. 1/2, Jan./Feb. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as BAR ASSOCIATION PROPOSAL]. See also K. AULETTA, THE STREETS WERE PAVED WITH
GOLD 98 (1979). Estimated useful lifetimes of budget items have not always been overesti-
mated in the Local Finance Law. "At least until the 1960's, allowable funding times tended
to be on the conservative, or short, side.. . . The financing of the IND subway, as an egre-
gious example, was originally planned with four-year bonds, although economic conditions
eventually forced a lengthening of the maturities." C. MORRIS, THE COST OF GOOD INTEN-
TIONS 131 (1980).
38. 41 A.D.2d 402, 343 N.Y.S.2d 950 (4th Dep't 1973), af'd, 34 N.Y.2d 628, 311 N.E.2d
504, 335 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1974).
39. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW art. 2, tit. 1, § 11a(42-a) (McKinney 1972) (repealed 1975).
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made, almost all municipal expenditures could be considered simi-
larly.40 The local finance law, however, still contains a large num-
ber of expense budget items assigned periods of usefulness to per-
mit borrowing. 41 Therefore, since overlapping jurisdictions are
permitted to levy taxes on the same property and some taxes are
not subject to constitutional limitations, the constitutional tax lim-
its, like the debt limits, are less powerful in practice than in
appearance.
C. The Property Value Base for the Constitutional
Limits
Debt and tax limits in New York are determined with reference
to the average full value of taxable real estate in the jurisdiction.'2
Full value is calculated by local officials from the total of assessed
values in the jurisdiction using studies made by the New York
State Board of Equalization and Assessment.' 3 The State Board
analyzes assessment levels and develops equalization rates" which
represent the local ritio of assessments to full value.45 Constitu-
40. 41 A.D.2d at 404-05, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 953. The legislature responded to Hurd v. City
of Buffalo by enacting new laws to permit the exclusion of retirement, social security and
health benefit costs from the tax limits. The legislation was declared unconstitutional in
Waldert v. City of Rochester, 90 Misc. 2d 472, 395 N.Y.S.2d 939 (Sup. Ct. 1977), modified
61 A.D.2d 147, 402 N.Y.S.2d 655 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 44 N.Y.2d 831, 378 N.E.2d 115, 406
N.Y.S.2d 752, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 922 (1978).
41. See, e.g., N.Y. LocAL FIN. LAW art. 2, tit. 1, §§ 11a(39) (judgments resulting from
property tax reduction proceedings); 53a (computer installation for tax assessment system);
73 (manpower development programs); 74 (off-track betting equipment); 76 (exterior clean-
ing of public buildings) (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1981). See also Debt Limit and New York
City, supra note 16, at 190-91.
42. N.Y. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 10.
43. The State Board of Equalization and Assessment was established pursuant to N.Y.
REAL PROP. TAX LAW §200 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980).
44. The equalization rate is calculated by the State Board pursuant to articles 12, 12-A
and 12-B of the Real Property Tax Law. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW arts. 12, 12-A, and 12-B
(McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980). Pursuant to § 1202, each year the State Board establishes
equalization rates based upon the percentage of full value that assessments of taxable real
estate represent in the jurisdiction for that year. At least once every five years, the State
Board samples the ratio of assessments to market value, pursuant to § 1200. Special equali-,
zation rates for cities with populations of 125,000 or more are established under § 1252,
using the last completed assessment roll and each of the four preceding rolls, with adjust-
ments for estimated changes in market value between market value surveys. Id. A similar
adjustment is used for city school districts in cities with populations of.less than 125,000
inhabitants, under §§ 1260-1264.
45. Equalization rates have uses other than for the calculation of the debt and tax limits.
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tionally mandated percentages are then applied to the full value to
determine the limits of local taxing and borrowing powers.
Amendments to the local finance provisions of the state consti-
tution in 1949 and 19514' changed the base for the calculation of
the tax and debt limits from assessed values to full values. These
amendments were intended to equalize local borrowing and taxing
powers and free them from arbitrary restrictions imposed by local
The full value of property calculated by the use of the equalization rate is used to determine
state aid to local school districts, with the amount of state aid apportioned in an inverse
ratio to the amount of property wealth in the district. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94
Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1978). The equalization rates are also important in appor-
tioning school taxes between municipalities which are located in the same school district.
The equalization rate is used to determine the full value of each municipality's property in
the district so that the portion of each municipality's taxes that support the school district
is directly proportional to the amount of property wealth in the district. See NEW YORK
STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION AND ASSESSMENT, EDUCATIONAL FINANCE AND THE NEW YORK
STATE REAL PROPERTY TAX: FULL VALUE ASSESSING AND EQUALIZATION 13-29 (1979). The
equalization rate is also used by taxpayers to challenge their assessments. Under § 706 of
the New York Real Property Tax Law, assessments may be -challenged on three grounds:
illegality, overvaluation or inequality. Illegality involves a claim that the property is tax-
exempt or not located in the taxing jurisdiction. Overvaluation requires proof that the prop-
erty is assessed at greater than market value. Since assessments generally are substantially
lower than market value, true overvaluation is rare. Inequality requires a showing "that the
assessment has been made at a higher proportionate valuation than the assessment of other
real property on the same roll by the same assessors." N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 706
(McKinney 1972). In 1961, § 720 of the Real Property Tax Law was amended to permit the
use of the equalization rate to prove inequality. 1961 N.Y. Laws ch. 942. Subsequent deci-
sions, Ed Guth Realty, Inc. v. Gingold, 34 N.Y.2d 440, 315 N.E.2d 441, 358 N.Y.S.2d 367
(1974) and 860 Executive Towers v. Board of Assessors, 84 Misc. 2d 525, 337 N.Y.S.2d 863
(Sup. Ct. 1975), affd 53 A.D.2d 463, 385 N.Y.S.2d 604 (2d Dep't 1976), aff'd sub nom. Pierre
Pellaton Apts. v. Board of Assessors, 43 N.Y.2d 769, 401 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 372 N.E.2d 801
(1977), shifted the burden of proof with respect to the use of the equalization rate in ine-
quality proceedings, permitting the use of the equalization rate alone to be proof of inequal-
ity and preventing jurisdictions from challenging the use of the rate once the rate had been
established by a court in an inequality suit. This use of the equalization rate has been the
source of much recent litigation, and § 720 has been significantly amended since 860 Execu-
tive Towers v. Board of Assessors. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 720 (McKinney 1972 &
Supp. 1980). See, e.g., Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, 97 Misc. 2d 637, 412
N.Y.S.2d 292 (Sup. Ct. 1978), af'd, N.Y.L.J. Jan. 26, 1981, at 1, col. 2 (2d Dep't Jan. 22,
1981); NEW- YORK STATE SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON CITIES AND CITY OF NEW YORK,
CERTIORARI 52-62 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CERTIORARI].
46. The amendment of article VIII, § 10 which changed the real estate tax limitation was
approved by the voters on November 8, 1949. The amendment of article VIII, § 4, which
changed the debt limitation was approved on November 6, 1951. See Constitutional His-
tory, supra note 11, at 159-60. The article XVIII, § 4 restriction on housing debt was not
modified, and the limitation remains based upon the average assessed value of property in
the jurisdiction.
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assessment ratios. By using the full value as a base, the limits
would bear a more direct relationship to local property wealth. 7
These amendments were also intended to increase local borrow-
ing and taxing powers where assessments were at levels signifi-
cantly less than full value.4 8 For example, where properties were
typically assessed at half their full value, local borrowing and tax-
ing powers would be half those of a jurisdiction where properties
were assessed at full value. Therefore, where local assessments
were close to full value, the modification of the base had little ef-
fect on local revenue-generating powers.4' Concurrent with the
change in the base, a number of percentage limits were amended.50
Tax exempt property is excluded from full value in calculating
the constitutional limitations. Although all real property in the
state is subject to taxation unless specifically exempted by law,"1
article four of the Real Property Tax Law5' and other laws53 pro-
vide partial or full exemptions from property taxes for property
owned by various levels of government, quasi-governmental au-
thorities, organizations and individuals.' 4 The value of these ex-
47. As a state committee recommending the modification of the tax limit reported:
Every municipality now has the power, and in fact is directed by law, to assess real
estate at full value. Read together, the present constitutional tax limitation and the
law requiring the assessment of property at full value, contemplate and intend that
the tax limitation should be based on 2% of the five year average of full valuation of
the real estate of the municipality.
Since the tax limitation is meant to restrain municipalities from levying taxes on
real estate out of proportion to the value of the property, it is fiscally sound to base
the limit on the full value of the real estate within the tax unit, rather than upon an
artificial value resulting from a low rate of assessment.
COMPTROLLER'S COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL TAX AND DEBT LIMITATION AND CITY SCHOOL
FISCAL RELATIONS, FIRST REPORT 3-4 (Mar. 3, 1948) [hereinafter cited as COMPTROLLER'S
COMMITTEE], quoted in TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE REAL PROPERTY TAX, REPORT
88 (Mar. 27, 1979) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON REAL PROPERTY TAX]. See also Constitu-
tional History, supra note 11, at 158.
48. See Local Finance, supra note 23, at 101; Macchiarola, supra note 24, at 273.
49. Macchiarola, supra note 24, at 273.
50. Constitutional History, supra note 11, at 158-60.
51. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 300 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980).
52. Id. art. 4.
53. E.g., N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1216, 1275 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1980); N.Y. PRIV.
Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 53, 260 (McKinney 1961 & Supp. 1980).
54. Most tax-exempt property is owned by various levels of state and local government
or by quasi-governmental authorities. See NEW YORK STATE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION
ON STATE AND LOCAL FINANCES, THE REAL PROPERTY TAX 89 (Mar. 15, 1975) [hereinafter
cited as STATE AND LOCAL FINANCES].
[Vol. IX
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emptions is continually rising.5s
The fact that the exempt value of property subject to certain
partial exemptions is excluded in the calculation of the limitations
may be based more on the application of sound fiscal practices"
than on legal decisions.57 At present, however, only the taxable
value of property subject to partial exemption is included in the
calculation of the limits.
III. Property Tax Assessment
The New York State Constitution" was amended to require that
measurements of tax and debt limits encompass the full value of
local property because property had not been assessed according to
uniform standards throughout the state.59 In this respect, New
York has much in common with jurisdictions throughout the coun-
try.60 Measurements of assessment uniformity show that actual as-
sessments often bear little relationship to legal assessment stan-
dards,61 and property tax burdens are rarely distributed uniformly
55. As of 1970, "real property tax exemptions in this State currently amount to nearly
twenty-three billion dollars. That figure represents a 3000 percent increase over the total
valuation of exempt properties as recorded on assessment rolls completed in 1900." JOINT
LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE TO STUDY AND INVESTIGATE REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS, FINAL
REPORT 8 (1970 Legislative Document #15), quoted in STATE AND LocAL FINANCES, supra
note 54, at 88. By 1976 the value of totally exempt property in New York State had grown
to 31.47 billion dollars. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1977 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS Vol. 2 at
28 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS].
56. The theory is that property not taxed to support the debt should not be included in
calculating the limit of the debt. See notes 137-39 infra and accompanying text.
57. This issue has not been directly addressed by a New York court. However, for dis-
cussions of related issues, see L.L.F. Realty Co. v. Fuchs, 273 A.D. 111, 75 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1st
Dep't 1947) and Huntington v. State Bd. of Equal. and Assessment, 81 Misc. 2d 457, 365
N.Y.S.2d 935 (Sup. Ct. 1975), afl'd, 53 A.D.2d 6, 385 N.Y.S.2d 389 (2d Dep't 1976).
58. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 4, 10.
59. See generally T. MCCORD & A. DORN, THE QUALITY OF ASSESSMENT PRACTICES IN
NEW YORK STATE: COEFFICIENTS OF DISPERSION FOR RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY (June 1980); NEW
YORK STATE DIVISION OF EQUALIZATION AND ASSESSMENT, REPORT ON PROPOSED REFORMS IN
REAL PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION (1980) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON REFORMS].
60. See CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, supra note 55, at 21.
61. Legal assessment standards are "standards specified in state law and/or administra-
tive regulations [that] establish what de facto assessment levels ought to be." Id. at 12. The
majority of legal assessment standards are based upon market value. Id. at 281-83. Market
value can be defined as "[t]he highest price in terms of money that a property will bring in
a competitive and open market, assuming that the buyer and seller are acting prudently and
knowledgeably, allowing sufficient time for the sale, and assuming that the price is not af-
fected by undue stimulus." INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, IMPROVING
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and according to value." This is despite the fact that the property
tax is the most important source of revenue for local governments
nationwide" and therefore would presumably be subject to strict
review.
In Hellerstein, the New York Court of Appeals noted that the
legal assessment standard of full value6 ' was often ignored by as-
sessors"' to such an extent that courts had determined that the
standard meant nothing more than assessment at uniform percent-
ages of full value.1" Even this standard has been proven to be
rarely obtainable. Properties of like type, in similar locations, often
show striking variations in assessments. As one state report de-
scribed current assessment practices: "assessments of residential
property are scattered with appalling randomness over a wide
range of deviation from the simple mean. The status quo of resi-
dential assessment in most municipalities does not differ signifi-
cantly in accuracy from what might be obtained by lottery."' 67 Lo-
cal officials typically assess different types of property at differing
percentages of full value. The percentage applied by the assessor
depends upon such factors as how the property is used, how valua-
ble it is, how long it has had the same ownership and where it is
located."
REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT 429 (1978).
62. CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, supra note 51, at 21.
63. Property taxes are the major source of revenue for local governments, raising $63
billion in 1979. They accounted for 78% of all locally collected taxes. N.Y. Times, Dec. 9,
1980, at A16, col. 4.
64. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 306 (McKinney 1972).
65. Hellerstein v. Assessor, Town of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d at 4-7, 332 N.E.2d at 281-83, 371
N.Y.S.2d at 391-93.
66. Id. at 7, 332 N.E.2d at 282-83, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 393. See C.H.O.B. Assocs. v. Board
of Assessors, 45 Misc. 2d 184, 257 N.Y.S.2d 31 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 22 A.D.2d 106, 256 N.Y.S.2d
550, (2d Dep't 1964), afl'd, 16 N.Y.2d 779, 209 N.E.2d 820, 262 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1965).
67. STATE OP NEW YORK, EDUCATIONAL FINANCE AND THE NEW YORK STATE REAL PROP-
ERTY TAX: THE INESCAPABLE RELATIONSHIP 7 (1976).
68. See, e.g., NEW YORK PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, INC., CITY OF UNEQUAL
NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY (1981);
NEW YORK PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, INC., ASSESS US AS YOU WILL: A STUDY OF
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENTS IN THE CITY OF SYRACUSE (1980). NYPIRG found
patterns of discrimination based upon neighborhood and value (with higher valued proper-
ties assessed at lower percentages of full value). Id. at 1, 9-13. See REPORT ON REAL PROP-
ERTY TAX, supra note 47, at 27, with respect to discrimination by use. Assessment by dura-
tion of ownership is sometimes known as the "welcome stranger" method, whereby
properties are reassessed as title transfers, subjecting the purchaser to assessments substan-
636 [Vol. IX
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Properties assessed at the highest percentages of their value are
owned generally by those who can most easily pass on the cost of
the tax to others or for whom the property tax is a relatively insig-
nificant factor in the cost of doing business. The lowest assess-
ments are typically applied to property owned by those for whom
the property tax is an important concern.69
Few jurisdictions in the state administer assessments in the
same manner. 7 Substantial differences exist as to which property
types are favored, and to what extent. Within a single jurisdiction,
for a single property type, there are often great differences in how
properties are assessed.7 1 These large variations account for the
great difficulty the legislature has faced in modifying the full value
standard while minimizing local tax shifts."
A. De Jure Classification
The. courts consistently have held that de jure classification sys-
tems do not violate the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment as long as they are based upon real dis-
tinctions.78 A number of states have enacted classified property tax
systems that have been affirmed by the courts.74 In many states,
the classification system was enacted as a result of a court decision,
such as Hellerstein, requiring compliance with a state full value
law. 5 Most states that have enacted classification systems have
tially higher than those of the previous owner. Id. at 23; CERTIORARI, supra note 45, at 6.
69. LoCAL FINANCE, supra note 23, at 36-37; REPORT ON REAL PROPERTY TAX, supra note
47, at 27. See also T. BOAST & J. VITULLO-MARTIN, THE FUTURE OF THE PROPERTY TAX 8, 26-
27 (1980).
70. See NEw YORK STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION AND ASSESSMENT, 1980 REVALUATIONS
PROPERTY TAX SHIFT ANALYSIS 3, 16 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 REVALUATIONS].
71. See, e.g., T. McCoRD & A. DORN, supra note 59; REPORT ON REFORMS, supra note 59.
72. See notes 106-09 infra and accompanying text.
73. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973); Walters v. City of St.
Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954). The legislature, however, must clearly delineate the guidelines
within which the assessor is to operate: "[delegating] to an administrative agency the power
to fix the ratio of assessment without formulating a definite and intelligible standard to
guide the agency in making its determination constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power." Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp. 615, 625 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Further.
more, there must be a rational basis for the classification. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297 (1976).
74. See, e.g., Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Apache County v.
Atchison, T. & S. Fe Ry., 106 Ariz. 356, 476 P.2d 657 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S.
1005 (1971); Standard Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 113 Or. 314, 335, 228 P. 812, 818-19 (1924).
75. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 249 F. Supp. 894
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done so by constitutional amendment.7
Classification may involve the use of differential levels of assess-
ment ("classified assessments") or the use of differential tax rates
("classified tax rates")." The former method is by far the most
popular..7  The goal of both methods is the same: the granting of
preferential tax treatment to the owners of certain types of proper-
ties. Both methods require the division of all properties into clas-
ses and the computation of the full value of all properties. In a
classified assessment system, each class has its own assessment ra-
tio, representing the percentage of full value subject to tax. A uni-
form tax rate is then applied to all non-exempt property. In a clas-
sified tax rate system, properties are assessed at full value and tax
rates are applied according to the property class.7
It is generally accepted that the legislature has the power to en-
act a classification system in New York.s0 A recent decision' sum-
marized the relevant New York case law:
The power of taxation is plenary and rests exclusively in the Legislature.
. . . It may classify property for tax purposes in any manner it deems ap-
propriate. . . and what it determines in respect of policy, it is also compe-
tent to change. . . . It may impose a heavy burden on one class of property
and no burden at all upon others; the remedy for injudicious action being in
(M.D. Tenn. 1966), aff'd, 389 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1968); Southern Pac. Co. v. Cochise County,
92 Ariz. 395, 377 P.2d 770 (1963). See also Hellerstein v. Assessor, Town of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d
at 13, 332 N.E.2d at 286, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 398; R. BEEBE & R. SINNOTT, IN THE WAKE OF
HELLERSTEIN: WHITHER NEW YORK? (1977); Lesnick, Does Full Value Mean Full Value?
Prospects for Assessment Reform in New York in Light of the Experiences of Other States
with Hellerstein's Progenitors, 5 HoFsTRA L. REV. 235, 245-71 (1977).
76. ALA. CONST. § 217; ILL. CONST. art. 9, § 4; LA. CONST. art. 7, § 18(d); MINN. CONST.
art. X, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. X, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. II, § 28; W. VA. CONST. art. 10, § lb.
77. M. KUPFERMAN, CLASSIFIED REAL PROPERTY TAX SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(1980).
78. Id. at 2.
79. Id. at 2-7.
80. The point has been made that since article XVI, § 2 of the constitution provides:
"The Legislature shall provide for the supervision, review, and equalization of assessments
for purposes of taxation," then a classification system is contrary to the concept of equaliza-
tion. Therefore, a constitutional amendment would be required to implement a classification
system. See ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF NEW YORK CITY, INC., REFORMING THE
REAL PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM IN NEW YORK 23 (1979) [hereinafter cited as REFORMING THE
PROPERTY TAX]. But see, e.g., LOCAL FINANCE, supra note 23, at 40: "under the present
Constitution the Legislature could classify the types of property subject to the property tax
and provide for differentials among tax rates for different classes."
81. Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, 97 Misc. 2d 637, 412 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Sup. Ct.
1978), aff'd, N.Y.L.J. Jan. 26, 1981, at 1, col. 2, (2d Dep't Jan. 22, 1981).
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the hands of the people, not the courts. . . . So long as the class subjected
to taxation is determined by some reasonable policy of differentiation, and
all in the same class have equality, the measure meets constitutional stan-
dards of equal protection. . . . That a 'fairer' taxing formula might have
been adopted is of no moment. .... 82
Uniformity clauses which require all property to be treated simi-
larly for tax purposes are sometimes present in a state's constitu-
tion. A state with such a clause may be barred from enacting a
classification scheme."" Many state constitutions, however, includ-
ing New York's, do not have uniformity clauses. The equal protec-
tion clause of the federal constitution does not prohibit classi-
fication."
B. De Facto Classification
Most state constitutions or property tax laws require property to
be assessed at its full value or by some variant requiring uniform-
ity, and for the same tax rate to be applied to all non-exempt
property.85 The practice of fractional assessment where state stat-
82. 97 Misc. 2d at 643-44, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 297. As to the authority the legislature has in
designing a classification system:
the Legislature has very nearly unconstrained authority in design of taxing imposi-
tions .... [F]airness and equity are not the principal criteria against which the va-
lidity of tax statutes is to be determined .... [It) is often immaterial, in the resolu-
tion of tax controversies to demonstrate that in application a particular statute or
regulation works even a flagrant unevenness....
Long Island Lighting Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 45 N.Y.2d 529, 535, 382 N.E.2d 1337, 1339-
40, 410 N.Y.S.2d 561, 563-64 (1978). A local law providing for an excise tax or license fee
applicable to businesses subject to supervision of the state public service commission was
upheld as reasonable by the court of appeals because of the public service nature of the
business and its protection against competition. New York Steam Corp. v. City of New
York, 268 N.Y. 137, 197 N.E. 172 (1935).
83. State v. Alabama Power Co., 254 Ala. 327, 48 So. 2d 445 (1950). See also LocAL
FINANCE, supra note 23, at 36-41.
84. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973); Allied Stores of
Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954).
See also Nashville, Chattanooga & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940):
It would be a narrow conception of jurisprudence to confine the notion of 'laws' to
what is found written on the statute books, and to disregard the gloss which life has
written upon it. ... Deeply embedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy
... are often tougher and truer law than the dead words of the written text....
Fictions have played an important and sometimes fruitful part in the development of
law; and the Equal Protection Clause is not a command of candor.
Id. at 369.
85. CENSUS oF GOVERNMENTS, supra note 55, at 281-83.
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utes or constitutions require assessment at full value, however, has
been sanctioned by the Supreme Court. In Sioux City Bridge Co.
v. Dakota County," the Court ordered an assessment lowered to
conform with the locally prevalent fractional assessment ratio, de-
spite state law to the contrary, stating: "where it is impossible to
secure both the standard of the true value, and the uniformity and
equality required by law, the latter requirement is to be preferred
as the just and ultimate purpose of the law. ''s7
The Supreme Court has also permitted de facto classification
schemes where some property is fractionally assessed and other
property is assessed at full value. In Nashville, Chattanooga & St.
Louis Railway v. Browning," local officials valued ordinary prop-
erty at less than the full value and state officials valued property
owned by railroads and other public service corporations at full
value. The Court held that this scheme did not violate the equal
protection clause:
That the states may classify property for taxation; may set up different
modes of assessment, valuation and collection; may tax some kinds of prop-
erty at higher rates than others; and in making all these differentations may
treat railroads and other utilities with that separateness which their distinc-
tive characteristics and functions in society make appropriate - these are
among the commonplaces of taxation and of constitutional law.6'
86. 260 U.S. 441 (1923).
87. Id. at 446. The decision went on to require the local assessor to violate the law for
the benefit of the taxpayer: "the right of the taxpayer ... is to.have his assessment reduced
... even though this is a departure from the requirement of statute." Id.
88. 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
89. Id. at 368. Local governments derive a number of benefits from fractional assessment
that explains its resilience despite laws requiring full-value assessment:
1) A low assessment ratio may delude a taxpayer into believing that the property tax rate
is lower than it actually is.
2) An error in assessment is hidden better with a fractional assessment system: a 5% error
where the assessment ratio is 30% and the value of the property is $100,000 is $1500, while
the same error with full value assessments represents a $5000 difference in assessed value.
The first error might be considered by the taxpayer to be too small to contest, while the
latter might not be-although the tax effect is the same.
3) A taxpayer assessed at less than full value, but at a higher level than the prevalent
assessment ratio, will have difficulty proving the inequality of the assessment, and may not
want to upset the status quo.
4) The effective tax rate can be increased by raising assessments without increasing the tax
rate itself, which might be unpalatable to local officials.
5) Assessments can be kept constant regardless of fluctuations in property value due to
prevailing economic conditions, making localities depression- or recession-proof.
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C. De Facto Classification in New York
Until its amendment in 1977,90 New York's assessment standard,
section 306 of the Real Property Tax Law, read simply: "All. real
property in each assessing unit shall be assessed at the full value
thereof." This standard had been law in New York since 1788.1
As early as 1852, the court of appeals found assessors to be es-
tablishing their own standards: "[w]e are informed by the learned
judge who delivered the opinion of the supreme court, that the
usual method is to estimate property at less than half its value,
under the obligation of an official oath, which requires its full value
to be stated. . ... 9" Despite decisions' requiring assessment at full
value the practice of illegal fractional assessment did not disap-
pear. The court of appeals found that fractional assessment was
occurring as a matter of course in 18739" and with some regularity
thereafter.9 4 A number of decisions held the practice to violate the
law and ordered compliance; 5 later decisions seemed to accept the
fractional assessment standard on the theory that the legislature
had acquiesced in this interpretation of the law." A 1964 supreme
court decision affirmed by the court of appeals described the pre-
vailing rule:
Section 306 provides that all real property shall be assessed at full value
thereof. Although full value has been held to be synonymous with market
value. .. the courts have uniformly held that this section does not man-
date assessments at 100% of full or market value. It requires merely that
the assessments be at a uniform rate or percentage of full or market value
for every type of property in the assessing unit. . . . The Legislature...
6) Some state governments, such as New York's, provide state aid in inverse proportion to
local property value. Although the governments that provide aid mathematically equalize
assessments before calculating state aid, local officials may attempt to underestimate prop-
erty value on the theory that it would be harmless to try to deceive the state.
See T. BOAST & J. VIrULLO-MARTIN, supra note 69, at 9.
90. 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 888 § 1.
91. 1788 N.Y. Laws ch. LXV. For the history of this standard in New York, see Heller-
stein v. Assessor, Town of Islip 37 N.Y.2d at 4, 332 N.E.2d at 280, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
92. Van Rensselaer v. Witbeck, 7 N.Y. 517, 522 (1852).
93. People ex rel. Board of Supervisors v. Fowler, 55 N.Y. 252, 253-54 (1873).
94. See Hellerstein v. Assessor, Town of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d at 4-5, 332 N.E.2d at 281-82,
371 N.Y.S.2d at 390-92.
95. Id. at 4-7, 332 N.E.2d at 281-82, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92.
96. C.H.O.B. Assocs. v. Board of Assessors, 45 Misc. 2d 184, 192, 257 N.Y.S.2d 31, 38
(Sup. Ct.), af'd, 22 A.D.2d 1015, 256 N.Y.S.2d 550 (2d Dep't 1964), af'd, 16 N.Y.2d 779, 209
N.E.2d 820, 262 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1965).
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has acknowledged and apparently sanction [sic] this State-wide practice."
The court of appeals' decision in Hellerstein in 1975 ended judi-
cial acceptance of de facto classification in New York. The court
responded to the Town of Islip's claim that the practical construc-
tion of the statute required only that property be assessed at a
uniform fraction of value by noting that "'practical construction'
is nothing more than a violation, which, no matter how persistent,
widespread and uncorrected, cannot alter the meaning of the stat-
ute."98 The decision required the Town of Islip to reassess all prop-
erty at full value by December 31, 1976.9
By implication, Hellerstein required all jurisdictions in the state
to revalue properties at full value.100 Some jurisdictions were or-
dered by the courts to conduct revaluations as a result of subse-
quent decisions.101 Many jurisdictions in the state initiated revalu-
ation programs voluntarily.10 2
The process of revaluation is time-consuming and costly.108 It is
also politically unpopular, since it frequently shifts effective tax
97. 45 Misc. 2d at 192, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
98. 37 N.Y.2d at 10, 332 N.E.2d at 284, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
99. Id. at 14, 332 N.E.2d at 287, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 400. This deadline was extended to July
1, 1978. Hellerstein v. Assessor, Town of Islip, modified, 39 N.Y.2d 920, 352 N.E.2d 593, 386
N.Y.S.2d 406 (1976).
100. Matter of Colt Industries, N.Y.L.J. June 4, 1980, at 10, col. 2, held that New York
City may enact a classified property tax system as described in this Comment by authority
of the N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, § 166-1.0(b). The court recognized that the state legislature has
traditionally treated New York City differently than other jurisdictions with respect to the
assessment and taxation of real property. The court further noted that the real estate taxa-
tion provisions of the Administrative Code are special legislation that control the general
statute, N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 306. Therefore, the court held that the Administrative
Code, which requires the taxpayer to prove inequality as against other property of like char-
acter in the same ward or section of the city, permits New York City to enact a classification
system. Colt, if upheld, could eliminate for New York City problems engendered by the
Hellerstein decision. Its effect on the constitutional tax and debt limits, the subject of this
Comment, was not at issue in Colt. (Colt was ignored by a subsequent supreme court deci-
sion which considered an issue similar to that decided in Colt. J.A. Green Constr. Corp. v.
Finance Adm'r, No. 12468-71 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 15, 1980)).
101. See, e.g., Riley v. Town of Conesville, 58 A.D.2d 665, 395 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dep't
1977); Forte v. Board of Assessors, 57 A.D.2d 915, 395 N.Y.S.2d 212 (2d Dep't 1977); See
also Herzog v. Assessor, City of New Rochelle, 69 A.D.2d 862, 415 N.Y.S.2d 445 (2d Dep't
1979), appeal denied, 47 N.Y.2d 711 (1979); Hoffman v. Assessor, Town of Stephentown, 63
A.D.2d 1093, 406 N.Y.S.2d 373 (3d Dep't 1978).
102. See REPORT ON REFORMS, supra note 59, at 5.
103. The New York State Division of Equalization and Assessment estimates the cost of
revaluations state-wide at $150 million. Id. at 7-8.
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rates from commercial properties to residential properties and
from over-assessed properties to under-assessed properties within
the same class.1 04
In order to protect those jurisdictions not yet under court order
to reassess, and to permit time to develop a replacement for the
full value standard, the legislature amended section 306, creating a
moratorium for compliance in jurisdictions making a good faith ef-
fort to revalue. This moratorium was recently extended to May 15,
1981.105
IV. Classification Legislation and the Tax and Debt
Limits
The difficulty involved in developing an alternate assessment
system that would minimize tax shifts prevented the legislature
from coming to an agreement on a revision to section 306 during
the 1980-1981 session. ' " Substantially different bills passed each
house during the session; in addition, a senate-approved bill signif-
icantly different from the other two was carried over from the prior
session.
The bill that was passed by the senate in the 1979-1980 session
("Esposito-Padavan") would maintain the status quo of assess-
ment administration. The bill would permit the continuation of as-
sessments by "any of the same methods of assessment" used prior
to 1975. In effect, this bill would delegate to local officials the de-
termination of assessment ratios. A local option could be enacted
to establish any other assessment standard, including full value.10 7
During the 1980 session, the senate passed the "Present-Good-
hue Bill" which would leave the full value standard intact. It pro-
104. The greatest shifts have generally occured within the same class. 1980 REVALUA-
TIONS, supra note 70; NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF EQUALIZATION AND ASSESSMENT, 1979
REVALUATIONS PROPERTY TAX SHIFT ANALYSIS (1979).
105. 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 888 § 1 enacted a moratorium until December 31, 1980. This
moratorium was extended to May 15, 1981 by the legislative session that was called toward
the end of 1980. See 1980 N.Y. Laws ch. 880.
106. Albany Fixes New Deadline on Hellerstein, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
107. Critics have claimed that the bill (N.Y.S. 4130; N.Y.A. 6136 202d Sess. (1979)) has
constitutional defects in its vagueness (permitting assessment by "any of the same methods"
as existed previously provides no clear direction to administrators) and because it delegates
the legislature's taxing and review powers. It is also questionable whether a rational basis
for the classifications it protects is present. See, e.g., SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMIT-
TEE, REAL PROPERTY TAx REFORM IN NEW YORK 3-4 (1981).
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posed to establish a homestead exemption (to a maximum of
twenty-five percent of assessed value as determined by the exercise
of a local option) which would cushion the transition to full value
for owner-occupied residences. It would also impose a "homestead
tax" on the portion of residential property value subject to the
homestead exemption.108
A bill introduced in the assembly by Speaker Stanley Fink
("Fink Bill") would establish nine classes of property based upon
use, with further subclassification subject to local option. To mini-
mize tax shifts each class (and subclass) would be assessed as
closely as possible to the current assessment ratio for that class of
property. For owner-occupied residential property, no tax increase
would become effective until title was transferred. The Fink Bill
would also permit the establishment of a homestead exemption by
local option.109
The sponsors of both the Fink and Present-Goodhue Bills recog-
nized that an interplay exists between the assessment standard
and the constitutional tax and debt restrictions. At issue is
whether the amount of property value that is exempt from assess-
ment through the operation of a classification system is to be in-
cluded in the value of taxable property in the jurisdiction for the
calculation of the limits. This question has been considered by few
courts, none of them in New York.
The 1977 Temporary State Commission on the Real Property
Tax,110 which recommended that the legislature not enact a classi-
fication system,"" noted that the only sure way to avoid the possi-
bility of classification operating to reduce the local debt and tax
108. N.Y.S. 9357, N.Y.A. 11,222 203d Ses. (1980).
109. N.Y.A. 10,000-D, 203d Sess. (1980). The Fink Bill also permits an assessing unit to
determine the value of property by a mathematical computation based upon average assess-
ment ratios in the jurisdiction, without the necessity of on-site inspection. The classes that
would be established are: residential (three or less dwelling units), apartment (more than
three dwelling units), commercial, industrial, agricultural, vacant, railroad, utility and spe-
cial franchise. Subclasses could be established for the residential and apartment classes of
property. New York City would be permitted to establish four subclasses of property; other
jurisdictions would be permitted to establish two subclasses. The subclasses could be based
upon such considerations as use or potential use, form of ownership, value, age, geographic
location and provisions of any applicable zoning ordinance or master plan.
110. See 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 889.
111. REPORT ON RF.A PROPERTY TAX, supra note 47, at 58-62.
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limits would be to enact a constitutional amendment. 1 2 The Com-
mission reported that this problem had also been recognized by the
Temporary State Commission on the 1967 Constitutional Conven-
tion. l"' This point also has been made by other commentators.1 4
A recent assembly committee report,"' however, which recom-
mended the adoption of an early version of the Fink Bill decided
that any ambiguity in the effect of classification on the limitations
could be cured by legislation:
Another objection to classification lies in the assertion that it might ad-
versely affect constitutional tax and debt limits .... Some legal authorities
believe that legalizing differential assessments would result in a redefinition
of taxable value as that percentage of full value that is actually subject to
taxation .... This argument, however, overlooks the fact that the, Constitu-
tion does not define taxable real estate. The legislature could obviate this
concern by defining taxable property so as to ensure that such a reduction
does not occur." 6
This approach of legislatively redefining a term in the constitu-
tional limitation was attempted unsuccessfully by the Penn-
sylvania legislature in 1961.
Pennsylvania's constitutional debt limit is based on the assessed
value of local property. As in New York, the legal assessment stan-
dard is full value. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
found in Breslow v. School District'" that the practice was to as-
sess at between fifteen and seventy percent of full value.'" In 1961,
112. Even though classification can be enacted, it does raise an ancillary legal ques-
tion which should be resolved before any classification system is considered. It is pos-
sible that a municipality's constitutional tax and debt limits would have to be re-
duced proportionately to the exemptions flowing from the classification system....
The issue has never been addressed by the courts or through administrative rul-
ings, however, it does involve a risk and in municipalities which are at or near their
tax limits, it poses a substantial fiscal question which could render classification un-
feasible. The only sure method of resolution of this question would be an amend-
ment to the Constitution.
Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 89.
114. T. BOAST & J. VITULLO-MARTIN, supra note 69, at 18-19; REFORMING THE PROPERTY
TAX, supra note 80, at 23-26; REPORT ON REFORMS, supra note 59, at 10-11; K. HAMILTON,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MoRE EQUITABLE REAL ESTATE TAX SYSTEM 18 (1978).
115. NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY TASK FORCE ON SCHOOL FINANCE AND REAL PROPERTY
TAXATION, THE LEGISLATIvE RESPONSE TO THE PROPERTY TAX CRISIS (1979).
116. Id. at 10.
117. 408 Pa. 121, 182 A.2d 501 (1962).
118. Id. at 125, 182 A.2d at 503.
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in an attempt to increase local borrowing powers the legislature
amended the Municipal Borrowing Law to define "assessed valua-
tion" as "market valuation." The amendment would have raised
the debt limit considerably.11
Holding the amendment unconstitutional, the court reasoned
that when the voters had adopted the constitution, the term "as-
sessed valuation" had a common meaning to the voters: the per-
centage of market value at which property was assessed for tax
purposes. 20 The court decided that the legislature could not rede-
fine commonly understood terms: "all that any Legislature would
have to do, in order to circumvent the Constitution, is to pass an
Act defining or redefining any term or any language used in the
Constitution to suit its purpose or objective. ' 121 Therefore, apply-
ing the same logic, a New York court would find the legislature
powerless to redefine the term "full valuation of taxable real es-
tate" in the constitutional limitation.12 2
A different approach would be taken by the Present-Goodhue
Bill. This proposal takes a position similar to that taken by the
New York State Division of Equalization and Assessment, which
assumes in a recent report 28 that the effect of classification would
be to reduce taxing and debt-incurring powers.124 This bill pro-
posed that municipalities could apply a "homestead allocation" or
homestead tax, to a portion of all residential property value, in-
cluding value subject to the homestead exemption. The effect
would be that the full value of homestead property would be taxed,
119. Id. at 126, 182 A.2d at 504.
120. Id.
121. id. at 127, 182 A.2d at 505.
122. If a New York court were to find that classification operated as an exemption, re-
moving a percentage of value from the calculation of the debt and tax limits, it is unlikely
that a redefinition of terms could avoid the constitutional limit. As the court found in Hurd,
the taxpayers have an important constitutional right not to be taxed in excess of the limits
they believed they had established: "The citizens of the State of New York, in establishing a
constitutional tax limit of 2% for operating expenses, presumably decided that this was the
maximum tax which could be levied on real property without becoming oppressive, and it
may not be circumvented by legislation." Hurd v. City of Buffalo, 41 A.D.2d at 405, 343
N.Y.S.2d at 953. But see Sigal, The Proposed Constitutional Amendments to the Local
Finance Article: A Critical Analysis, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 29, 31 (1979) ("[T]he New York
Court of Appeals has responded with great deference to legislative acts respecting fiscal
matters when those acts have been challenged under the state constitution.").
123. REPORT ON REFORMS, supra note 59.
124. Id. at 10-11.
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albeit by two taxes at different rates.1""
An important question, however, is whether the courts would
agree that classified assessments would affect the taxable value
base, as the Division of Equalization and Assessment assumed.
Few states employ a system of constitutional tax and debt limi-
tations combined with a statutory assessment standard. Therefore,
courts rarely have considered the effect of a modification of the
assessment standard on the constitutional limitations.'" Most of
the eleven jurisdictions which have enacted classification systems
did so by constitutional amendment.12 7 Other states with statutory
classification systems do not have constitutional taxing or borrow-
ing restrictions. 128 In addition, New York's restrictions are rela-
tively unique in that they are based upon the full value of taxable
property in the jurisdiction, rather than upon the assessed value.
Hence, clear precedents are difficult to find.
Where constitutional limitations are based upon assessed value,
courts must consider whether the enactment of classification in-
creases local borrowing or taxing powers. This is because the initial
effect of classification is to increase fractional values to full value
125. "By continuing to levy a tax against the entire assessment roll, this device will pro-
duce the same mathematical effect as the application of an exemption, while avoiding the
unintended potential fiscal problems associated with a reduced taxable value base." Id. at
11. See also SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE, REAL PROPERTY TAx REFORM IN NEW
YORK 13-17 (1981).
The proposals to have a regular tax levy and a homestead tax option would create, in
effect, a classified tax rate system. A classified tax rate system would most likely avoid
problems with the constitutional tax and debt limits that could be created by classified
assessment systems. This is because classified rates would not operate to exempt any prop-
erty value from taxation. The option of classified tax rates has received little attention in
the legislature, no doubt due to the potential political unpopularity of the legislature's de-
termining the rates of tax one class would pay relative to another. Although the determina-
tion of class-wide tax rates would have the same effect as the determination of class-wide
assessment levels, the act itself would likely receive more public notice because taxpayers
could see the impact of the legislature's decision more clearly. See T. BOAST & J. VITULLO-
MARTIN, supra note 69, at 18-19.
126. Eleven jurisdictions have legalized classified real property tax systems: Alabama,
Arizona, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, South Carolina, Tennessee, West
Virginia and the District of Columbia. Illinois permits cities with populations of 200,000 or
more to classify subject to a local option. See KUPFERMAN, supra note 77. All but Arizona,
West Virginia and Montana adopted constitutional amendments in order to implement clas-
sification. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, CLASSIFIED PROPERTY TAX
SYSTEMS IN THE U.S. 1 (1979).
127. See note 76 supra.
128. B. MANN & F. BiRD, supra note 8, at Table 2.
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prior to reduction to taxable value. The courts are divided as to
whether, under these circumstances, the taxable (fractional) values
determine the base for the calculation of the limits, or the full
values.1 2 9
In Phelps v. City of Minneapolis, for example, the Minnesota
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the limit of net
indebtedness of "10 percent of the last assessed value of all taxable
property" meant that the base was the full value or the value after
the appropriate classification fractions were applied pursuant to
the classification statute.8 0 The court held that the lower value,
that is, the value after the classification fractions were applied, was
appropriate for calculation of the debt limit because to do other-
wise would have caused a substantial increase in local borrowing
powers.8 1
The Montana Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion
immediately after the enactment of Montana's classification law,18 2
holding that the term "assessed value" in the constitutional bor-
rowing limit meant the full value prior to the reduction to the frac-
tional assessment, since the language was "too plain to admit of
doubt or to require the citation of authorities to support the con-
clusion . , .""I The court was unconcerned with the fact that the
decision permitted the issuance of bonds at a level three times that
which would have been possible prior to the enactment of the clas-
sification law.8 4
Since classification operates in a manner similar to an exemp-
tion, the percentage of property value not taxed under a classifica-
tion system could be treated as though it were exempt through
more typical exemption measures. Most courts have held that ex-
129. 174 Minn. 509, 219 N.W. 872 (1928).
130. Id. at 511, 219 N.W. at 873.
131. Id. at 512, 219 N.W. at 874.
132. 1919 Mont. Laws ch. 51.
133. State v. Board of Comm'rs, 56 Mont. 387, 389, 185 P. 456, 457-58 (1919).
134. The Montana legislature was concerned, however, and enacted a law limiting the
base for the debt limit to the taxable value of property in the jurisdiction, defining the
taxable value as the percentage of full value remaining after the classification fraction is
applied. The substitution of the taxable value for the assessed value as a base was upheld by
the Montana Supreme Court in Heckman v. Custer County, 70 Mont. 84, 223 P. 916 (1924).
The court reasoned that since the debt limit in the state constitution represented an outside
limit, the legislature was free to reduce the constitutional limit as it saw fit. Id. at 85, 223 P.
at 918. See also State v. Cooney, 97 Mont. 75, 32 P.2d 851 (1934).
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empt property is not included in the determination of the value of
taxable property for calculation of the limits.135 With respect to
borrowing limitations, the typical rationale of the decisions is that
property that cannot be taxed to repay the bonds must not be per-
mitted to increase borrowing powers."'
For example, in Kentucky, property exempt from county taxa-
tion but subject to state taxation was not considered to be in-
cluded in "value of taxable property in the county" for calculation
of the county's debt limit:
the framers of our Constitution in limiting the amount of indebtedness the
county might incur to not exceeding 2% of the value of taxable property in
the county, intended that the taxable property would bear the obligation of
satisfying the bonded indebtedness .... [As the exempt property] cannot
be taxed for the purpose of maturing these bonds, it cannot be included in
the 'value of taxable property' in the county.3 7
Similarly, in Wyoming, it was held that the assessed value of
property bought by a county after tax delinquency could not be
used to support the local school debt.' " The Wyoming Supreme
Court reasoned that taxes should be assessed to determine a price
for redemption of the property by the prior owner, but since it was
questionable whether the taxes would be paid, the value of the
property should not increase the school district's borrowing
powers.1 39
135. "[T]he majority of the few cases on the subject have held or recognized that tax-
exempt property is not to be included in determining the value of taxable property for debt
limit purposes." Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 903, 904 (1953). See, e.g., State v. City of Pompano,
136 Fla. 730, 188 So. 610 (1938); Campbell v. Red Bud Consol. School Dist., 186 Ga. 541, 198
S.E. 225 (1938); Thornburgh v. School Dist., 175 Mo. 12, 75 S.W. 81 (1903).
136. See notes 137-39 infra and accompanying text.
137. Monroe County v. County Debt Comm'n, 247 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Ky. 1952).
138. Williams v. School Dist., 56 Wyo. 1, 102 P.2d 48 (1940).
139. The court stated that it "cannot readily see how that particular property will 'even-
tually have to bear its proportion of the burden of retiring the bonded debt,' "Id. at 17, 102
P.2d at 53, and was concerned about the sufficiency of the tax base: "[njeither a school
district nor a county can afford to have its credit impaired by the issuance of obligations
likely to be defaulted in the not distant future." Id. at 18, 102 P.2d at 54. See also Thorn-
burgh v. School Dist., 175 Mo. 12, 75 S.W. 81 (1903), where railroad property and
merchants' stocks which were not taxable by the school district could not be included in
calculating the debt limit. The court stated that "[t]he plain purpose of the Constitution is
to forbid the incurring of a public debt beyond a certain per centum of the value of the
property taxable for its payment." Id. at 30, 75 S.W. at 85.
Some courts, however, permit property not subject to taxation for the repayment of bonds
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In New York, in determining whether the value of exempt prop-
erty should be included in calculating the limitation, the consider-
ation of whether or not the property will produce taxes may be less
important than the fact that the local government retains the
power to levy taxes if it so chooses. In L.L.F. Realty Co. v. Fuchs1 40
the appellate division held that the value of property subject to tax
should be included for purposes of calculating the constitutional
debt limit irrespective of whether or not a tax is actually extended
against the property.14 1 In L.L.F. Realty, the City of Long Beach
was prevented by its charter from levying taxes on property "bid
in by the city treasurer at a tax sale or against which the city held
or owned tax liens.' 141 The court concluded that the property was
still subject to taxation for purposes of calculating the limitations
because the charter could have been amended at any time to ex-
tend taxes to these properties. Moreover, the court concluded that
the properties were at least contingently liable for taxes which
could be collected if the properties were redeemed by their owner
or sold at a tax sale.14 3 This logic was followed in Huntington v.
State Board of Equalization and Assessment,4 4 which permitted
the full value of property subject to partial veterans'14 5 or clergy 4"
exemptions to be included in calculating the equalization rate de-
spite the fact that only the non-exempt portion of the property
value was taxed.147
to be included in calculating the debt limit. For example, the Iowa Supreme Court permit-
ted certain monies and credits taxable only for limited purposes to increase the general
debt-incurring power of a municipality although the property was not taxable for the repay-
ment of the debt. Zobel v. Schau, 260 Iowa 796, 150 N.W.2d 626 (1967). See also Board of
Educ. v. Passey, 122 Utah 102, 246 P.2d 1078 (1952); Hansen v. City of Hoquiam, 95 Wash.
132, 163 P. 391 (1917).
140. 273 A.D. 111, 75 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1st Dep't 1947).
141. Id. at 113, 75 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
142. Id. at 112-13, 75 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
143. Id. at 113, 75 N.Y.S.2d at 359. For practical reasons, the city was spared from futile
attempts to collect taxes on the property or from preparing fictious budgets assuming that
the taxes would be paid. Id.
144. 81 Misc. 2d 457, 365 N.Y.S.2d 935 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 53 A.D.2d 6, 385 N.Y.S.2d
389 (2d Dep't 1976).
145. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 458 (McKinney 1972).
146. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 460 (McKinney 1972).
147. The court held that the veterans' or clergy exemption should have no effect on
either the assessed or full values since they represented a "limited personal and transitory
exemption" with relevance only in calculating the taxpayer's liability, 53 A.D.2d at 8, 385
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Courts have paid particular attention to the wording of the limi-
tation to determine the measure of property value that the legis-
lature or the public intended to be used. In Breslow"1 8 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court determined that the constitutional
limitations based upon assessed values meant assessments for tax-
ation, which were commonly known to represent a fraction of mar-
ket value.1 9 In California, however, because the legislature had es-
tablished some limits based on assessed value of taxable property
and other limits based upon the value of all property, the debt in-
curred by a utility district was held to be based on the total value
of property in the district irrespective of whether the property was
subject to taxation. 50
In New York, the constitutional limitation is based upon the
"full valuation of the taxable real estate" in the jurisdiction.1 1
Prior to the 1949 and 1951 constitutional amendments, the limita-
tion was based upon "the assessed valuation of the real estate sub-
ject to taxation. ' 152 The report of the committee,11 3 which recom-
mended the change from assessed valuation to full value as a base,
does not discuss the change in wording from "subject to taxation"
N.Y.S.2d at 391. The court reasoned that the exemptions would be removed if the property
were sold to an ineligible owner, and therefore the eligibility of the present owner should
not determine the treatment of the property for the purpose of calculating the equalization
rate. A classification system would not operate in the same manner as the situations present
in the Huntington or L.L.F. Realty cases. Unlike the property involved in L.L.F. Realty, the
exempt value of property under a classification system would not be contingently liable for
taxes. Unlike the situation involved in Huntington, the classification-created exemptions
would be dependent upon such factors as property type, use and location, which presumably
are relatively permanent.
148. Breslow v. School Dist., 408 Pa. 121, 182 A.2d 501 (1962).
149. Id. at 126, 182 A.2d at 504.
150. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Shasta Dam Area Pub. Util. Dist., 135 Cal. App. 2d 463,
287 P.2d 841 (1955):
[The legislature] chose in the case of the cities, utility districts and certain subdivi-
sions of the State, to limit bonding capacity to a percentage of the assessed value of
all property within the taxing unit; it chose in the case of counties, schools, and cer-
tain other subdivisions of the State, to limit to a percentage of the assessed value of
taxable property.
Id. at 469, 287 P.2d at 845-46. The court, therefore, decided to "assume that the Legislature
knew what it was saying and meant what it said." Id. at 465, 287 P.2d at 844.
151. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 4, 10.
152. See Constitutional History, supra note 11, at 158-59.
153. COMPTROLLER'S CoMmrrrma, supra note 47.
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to "taxable real estate, ' " and it is reasonable to infer that the
change was not intended to have an effect on the measurement of
the base. 55 In such a case, the prior wording would imply that the
value of property excluded from taxation by the operation of a
classification system should be excluded from the calculation of
the debt and tax limits.1"
V. Effect on Antecedent Debts
Some courts have considered the assessment standard to be part
of the contract between the municipality and the purchaser of the
bonds and have held that any change in the standard violates fed-
eral constitutional prohibitions against laws impairing contracts. 7
This has been held to be so even where the classification system
resulted in no change in assessed values.1" Thus, if a court were to
hold that the enactment of classification legislation reduced the
taxable value base for the calculation of debt-incurring powers, it
could invalidate the statute as a possible impairment of the secur-
ity of the bonds.
The Supreme Court has taken inconsistent positions with re-
spect to how material a modification of a bondholder's security or
a change in his remedies must be before it finds an unconstitu-
tional impairment. In Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 6" the Court
held a law which limited the rate of the property tax and which
154. Id.
155. This was noted by the 1977 Temporary State Commission on the Real Property
Tax. REPORT ON RsAL PROPERTY TAx, supra note 47, at 88.
156. See also N.Y. LocAL FIN. LAw, art. 1, § 2.00(7), (7-a) (McKinney 1968), where the
distinction in wording is retained.
157. The contract clause provides: "No State shall ... pass any ... law impairing the
obligation of contracts. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
158. See, e.g., Town of Samson v. Perry, 17 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1927). Bonds were issued by
the town when the legal assessment standard was full value. Subsequently the legislature
amended the standard requiring assessment at 60% of full value. The court held the amend-
ment void as to antecedent debts despite the fact that the amendment merely made the
prior de facto standard legal.
We do not think it is material whether, after the enactment of that statute, 60 per-
cent of the assessed value of property in the town of Samson actually was more or
less than 100 percent of the value of the same property as it was assessed prior to
that enactment.
Id. at 2. The court ordered the full value of property to be taxed until the antecedent debt
was repaid. Id.
159. 71 U.S. 535 (1866).
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repealed a special levy for the repayment of bonds unconstitu-
tional. The decision in Von Hoffman emphasized the substantiality
of the impairment created by the law and concluded that a legisla-
ture does have the right to modify the bondholders' remedies so
long as "no substantial right secured by the contract is thereby
impaired." 110 This case lent support to a number of subsequent de-
cisions which carefully weighed the materiality of the
impairment.1 1
Recently, the Supreme Court's decision in United States Trust
Co. v. New Jersey1" may have signaled' s that the Court will take
an absolute position with respect to laws affecting the security of
bonds, to the extent of finding an impairment even where the mar-
ketability of the bonds is unaffected. In United States Trust,
bondholders challenged legislation purporting to repeal retroac-
tively a covenant which guaranteed purchasers of bonds of the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey that the Authority
would refrain from acquiring certain mass transit facilities.1" The
Court, however, did not determine that the impairment was mate-
rial; rather, it determined that the covenant was "not superflu-
ous '' 65 and the state had made no effort to compensate the bond-
holders for the repeal of the covenant. 16e The Supreme Court did
not consider significant the lower court's finding that the invest-
ment rating of the Authority's bonds showed no permanent reduc-
tion attributable to the passage of the law.""
160. Id. at 553.
161. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); East New York Savings
Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945); Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316
U.S. 502 (1942). These cases and Von Hoffman are discussed in Bond, Enhancing the Se-
curity Behind Municipal Obligations: Flushing and U.S. Trust Lead the Way, 6 FoRwHnA
URs. L.J. 1, 8-22 (1977) and Hurst, Municipal Bonds and the Contract Clause: Looking
Beyond United States Trust Company v. New Jersey, 5 HAsTINGs CONST. L.Q. 25, 26-27, 32-
36 (1978).
162. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
163. See Hurst, supra note 161, at 59.
164. 431 U.S. at 13. See 1974 N.J. Laws ch. 25; 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 993.
165. Id. at 19.
166. Id.
167. The lower court found that the bonds retained their high ratings from the invest-
ment advisory services after the repeal of the covenant, and the market price of the bonds,
although showing an initial decline, had risen to a level comparable to that existing prior to
the passage of the legislation. United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 179-82,
338 A.2d 833, 864-65 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd, 431
19811
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Therefore, following United States Trust, a law reducing the
amount of assessed value taxable to support the repayment of an
antecedent debt could be voided as a violation of the contract
clause if the assessment standard were to be considered "not su-
perfluous" to the purchasers of the bonds.10 8 This could be held to
be so even without proof that the law impairs the bondholders' se-
curity or otherwise impairs their contract.
Alterriatively, a harsh result could arise if bonds were issued to a
level based upon full value and a court were to subsequently de-
cide that the limit should have been based upon the classified
(fractional) value. Under similar circumstances, it has been held
that a jurisdiction issuing bonds beyond the local borrowing power
is not estopped from denying the validity of the bonds when they
are presented for payment.
U.S. 1 (1977). Although the investment value of the covenant may have been minimal, one
writer has noted that the attempted repeal of the covenant by the New Jersey legislature
(and subsequently, the New York legislature) in 1975 carried with it "enormous psychologi-
cal implications." K. AULMTFA, supra note 37, at 86. "Investors took this as a sign that the
government's-or, more precisely, the politicians'-word was no good." Id. The result was
that the municipal bond investment community subsequently took a much more jaundiced
view of moral obligation bonds issued by the City of New York, which required "investor
confidence" to sell. Later, that same investment community would take a much harder look
at New York City's financial statements, leading to the fiscal collapse of 1975. The impor-
tant point is that investor confidence may be at issue with respect to a modification of the
assessment standard, and the marketability of municipal securities may be affected by these
types of indirect forces. See note 175 infra and accompanying text.
168. The court of appeals had indicated prior to United States Trust that it would in-
validate laws modifying bondholders' remedies. In Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assis-
tance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E. 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976), the court of appeals
invalidated the New York City Emergency Moratorium Act, 1975 N.Y. Laws chs. 874, 875,
holding that the legislation violated the "faith and credit" provisions of N.Y. CONST. art.
VIII, § 2. The Act would have prevented certain holders of short term notes from enforcing
payment on them for three years. See Bond, supra note 161, at 3-7.
A court could also develop a less drastic alternative to invalidation of a law which was
held to impair the contract of the bondholders. When the Florida Constitution was
amended to exempt homestead property from taxation, the Florida Supreme Court ordered
property eligible for the exemption to continue to be taxed until the antecedent indebted-
ness was repaid, unless the legislature appropriated sufficient funds to replace the taxes that
would have been obtained from the exempt property, Long v. St. John, 126 Fla. 1, 170 So.
317 (1936). See also Town of Samson v. Perry, 17 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1927); People ex rel.
Boyle v. Trustees, Village of Edgewater, 51 N.Y. 280, 25 Barb. 16 (Sup. Ct. 1876) (where
local power to levy taxes was decreased by the legislature, debts incurred by the village prior
to the effective date of the legislation had to be paid from taxes levied outside the limit, if
funds were unavailable to pay the debt inside the limit); State v. Cooney, 97 Mont. 75, 32
P.2d 851 (1934); Annot., 109 A.L.R. 817 (1937).
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For example, in Thornburgh v. School District No. 3,69 the Mis-
souri Supreme Court found that a school district had issued bonds
based upon the assumption that railroad property and merchants'
stocks were included in calculating the value of local property for
determining the debt limit.170 Subsequent to the issuance of the
bonds, railroad property and merchants' stocks were held not to be
included. 171 When the bonds were produced for payment the
school district refused to redeem them. The bondholder sued, but
the court agreed with the school district and found the bonds, in-
cluding amounts issued within the debt limit, void.17
Similarly, in State v. Spring City, 7 3 the Utah Supreme Court
held that certain municipal bonds were issued in an amount ex-
ceeding local revenues, violating taxpayer protections in the state
constitution. The court held that the bonds were void, and the
state, which had purchased the bonds, was denied restitution.1 74
In light of the court's harsh position with respect to bonds issued
beyond constitutional restrictions, it is important that potential
purchasers be absolutely certain of the legality of bonds issued af-
ter a modification of the assessment statute. Any uncertainty in-
volved could severely restrain the marketability of the bonds.7'7
169. 175 Mo. 12, 75 S.W. 81 (1903).
170. Id. at 29, 75 S.W. at 85.
171. Id. at 31, 75 S.W. at 86.
172. Id.
173. 123 Utah 471, 260 P.2d 527 (1953).
174. The constitutional provisions were enacted as a protection for the taxpayers
against an abuse of their credit. The protection is absolute in nature. If recovery is
allowed against the municipality on a theory of money had and received, the entire
purpose for which the provision exists is contravened. Although the legal theory is
changed, the practical result would be payment by taxpayers of an obligation against
which the Constitution specifically attempts to protect them.
Id. at 476, 260 P.2d at 531. See also Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U.S. 190 (1885); Town of
Belleair v. Olds, 127 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1942); State v. City of Pompano, 136 Fla. 730, 188
So. 610 (1939); Fairbanks Morse Co. v. City of Geary, 59 Okla. 22, 157 P. 720 (1916).
175. New York Constitution article VIII, § 4 makes any indebtedness created in excess
of the constitutional limit void. See Bank for Say. v. Grace, 102 N.Y. 313, 7 N.E. 162 (1886).
The bonding power is measured at the time of the issuance of the bonds. Gibson v. Knapp,
21 Misc. 499, 47 N.Y.S. 446 (Sup. Ct. 1897); 6 Op. N.Y. COMP. 167-68 (1950). Although the
rating of bonds is not directly related to the proposed property tax legislation, uncertainties
involving the security behind the bonds could reduce their marketability. The recent pas-
sage of Massachusetts' property tax limitation measure was solely responsible for the down-
grading of the City of Boston's bonds, because it reduced the city's "financial flexability."
N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1980, at A20, col. 5. The passage of Proposition 13 in California caused
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VI. Conclusion
Legislation directing local officials to assess and tax real property
at less than full value is an attractive option to avoid precipitous
tax increases for property owners now currently underassessed.
However, New York's assessment standard does not stand alone; it
is closely related to local government borrowing and taxing powers
restricted by the state constitution. If these powers were held to be
limited in any way by a modification of the assessment standard,
the effect on local governments which rely heavily on borrowing, or
which are taxing at levels close to the limits, would be calami-
tous. 7 6 Reductions in local tax revenues could result in personnel
layoffs and service cutbacks; reductions in borrowing powers could
restrict funds sorely needed for the repair or replacement of capi-
tal improvements. Alternatively, a modification of the assessment
standard could be set aside, as impairing the security of the bonds,
thus violating federal constitutional guarantees against laws im-
pairing contracts. A finding that the legislation reduced local bor-
rowing powers after bonds were issued with the assumption that
borrowing was unaffected could make the bonds void and
irredeemable.
Whether bonds were issued in excess of the borrowing limits is
perhaps the most important consideration. Uncertainty among
bondholders results in higher interest rates to compensate for the
investment risk. As was evident during New York City's fiscal cri-
sis, any impairment in the marketability of municipal securities
has a crippling effect on local government operations. 177
The possibility that a change in the assessment standard could
one rating service to suspend ratings on all county and municipal bonds. International Asso-
ciation of Assessing Officers, Property Tax Limitation Legislation: An Evaluation, 14 As-
SESSORS JOURNAL 129, 142 (1979).
176. The Temporary Commission on the 1967 Constitutional Convention found four cit-
ies in the State taxing at 99% of the Constitutional limit: New York City, Rochester, Syra-
cuse, and Yonkers. Most jurisdictions in the state were substantially below their limits. Lo-
CAL FINANCE, supra note 23, at 47, 53-54. This may have been a transitory condition. Since
1967, New York City has taxed at approximately the limit in five years and significantly
below it in eight years. T. BOAST & J. VrrULLO-MARTIN, supra note 69, at 8. As of June 30,
1980, New York City was borrowing at a level of approximately $1.5 billion below the debt
limit. CITv OF NEw YORK, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1980 159 (1980). The city was also below the housing debt
margin by over $200 million. Id. at 160.
177. See Bond, supra note 161, at 24-25.
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substantially impair the marketability of municipal securities is a
compelling argument for modifying the assessment standard
through a constitutional amendment. At the same time, a more
comprehensive revision of the local finance article of the state con-
stitution might now be appropriate. A number of writers have
pointed out that New York's constitutional tax and debt limits are
an inconsistent pattern of overlapping provisions, with important
exceptions and exclusions which violate the intent of the limits. 8
In fact, some writers have directly attributed New York City's
fiscal crisis to tax limits which encourage borrowing over more
realistic financing mechanisms.'9
An amendment of the constitutional debt and tax limits could
resolve any uncertainty regarding the effect of a modification of
New York's assessment standard. At the same time, an amend-
ment could simplify the local finance provisions of the state consti-
tution, and could encourage the application of sound fiscal prac-
tices.180 It is important, therefore, that the legislature consider a
constitutional amendment when it addresses the full value assess-
ment question.' 8'
Alan J. Weiss*
178. See, e.g., Gelfand, supra note 27, at 558-66; Macchiarola, supra note 24, at 285.
179. Constitutional History, supra note 11, at 175. Some commentators have also sug-
gested that local property value is a poor standard to use to determine debt and tax limits.
See BAR ASSOCIATION PROPOSAL, supra note 37, in which a simplification of N.Y. CONST. art.
VIII, is proposed, including borrowing limits based upon local revenues instead of on local
property values. See, e.g., Bowman, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52 IowA L.
REv. 863 (1967); Constitutional History, supra note 11, at 169.
180. See LOCAL FINANCE, supra note 23, at 56-64, 108-27, for recommendations proposed
for the 1967 Constitutional Convention, and discussion of the proposals in Constitutional
History, supra note 11, at 177-79. See also BAR ASSOCIATION PROPOSAL, supra note 37, for a
more recent proposal to amend article VIII of the constitution.
181. There are two ways the constitution may be amended: passage by the legislature, an
intervening general election of members of the assembly, passage by the new legislature and
approval by the voters; or adoption by a constitutional convention and approval by the
voters. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 2.
* The student-writer is an employee of the Finance Department of the City of New York.
The views expressed in this Comment are those of the writer and do not represent the City
of New York's position on this issue.
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